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Introduction  
Ideas at stake 
 At some point in the late autumn or early winter of 1945, two junior diplomats began a 
lifelong friendship within Moscow’s insulated embassy district. One was a budding expert on 
Russian affairs, an American among the most knowledgeable and perceptive of the personnel in 
the United States’ thinly staffed Moscow embassy, and perhaps even the entire State 
Department.1 The other was a new arrival in the British complex, an Oxford academic trained in 
analytical philosophy who had made a bit of a name for himself in the British Foreign Office by 
writing especially witty and penetrating dispatches about the state of American public opinion 
5,000 miles away in Washington and New York.2 The American was George Kennan; the 
Englishman was Isaiah Berlin.  
 The two came to know each other during the interim period between Nazi Germany’s 
surrender and the beginning of the Cold War, at a time when the United States and her Western 
European allies were still unsure whether the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was an old 
wartime friend or newly found foe.3 As the Russian winter descended on Moscow in 1945, 
neither man could have known the eventual magnitude of his own role, let alone the other’s, in 
the coming Cold War. While Kennan’s impact on American policy toward the Soviet Union has 
since become a familiar aspect of Cold War scholarship, the Cold War implications of Berlin’s 
many works have been frequently overlooked. Instead, Berlin’s works are often taken out of their 
Cold War context and read as independent pieces of intellectual history or political theory.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York: Penguin, 2011), 172-3.  
2 Michael Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998), 114. 
3 Princeton University Library, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Public Policy 
Papers, John Lewis Gaddis Papers on George F. Kennan, Box 1, Folder 2, Interview with Sir Isaiah 
Berlin and Lady Berlin, Oxford, England, November 29, 1992, 1.  
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While Berlin did not seek to influence Cold War policy the way Kennan did, to regard 
him as merely a Cold War observer, and not a participant, is to the detriment of the historical 
understanding of the conflict. By examining Berlin as an involved Cold War figure and his 
writing as Cold War artifact, this thesis hopes to understand the American-Soviet conflict from 
an intellectual and moral perspective that is currently incomplete.   
 From early on in his life, Berlin had admired the works of writers and social thinkers in 
nineteenth century Russia, foremost among them Leo Tolstoy. Indeed, Berlin’s characterization 
of their approach as “essentially moral” paralleled his own intellectual concerns, which were 
similarly moral.4 As Mark Lilla points out in his foreword to a volume of Berlin’s essays, Berlin 
cared to know more about things such as “the foundation of morality, the concept of justice, the 
conflicting claims of citizenship and community, the meaning of history.”5 As if trying to live up 
to his mental image of Tolstoy, Berlin showed a desire to discover what he could about the 
human condition, asking questions that had occupied political philosophers since Plato and 
Aristotle. This is not to say, however, that Berlin’s works belong only on a shelf as one example 
of the many twentieth century contributions to political philosophy.   
 The fundamentally intellectual and deeply moral questions that concerned Berlin were 
also central to the Cold War. To understand Berlin’s mindset is to understand a prominent set of 
interests, fears, and motivations that occupied the conscience of Western thinkers concerned with 
the growing power of Communism and the Soviet Union. Berlin’s works articulated a frame of 
mind shared by more policy-oriented Cold War intellectuals such as Kennan. In his Long 
Telegram and “X Article,” Kennan proposed a set of actionable strategies and procedures 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Berlin, “The Pursuit of the Ideal,” in The Crooked Timber of Humanity (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013), 3. 
5 Mark Lilla, Foreword to Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2013), xi.  
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relevant to both policymakers and the public in negotiating and coping with a rising Soviet 
threat. Kennan cared that Cold War threats existed and worried about how to manage them 
without stopping to explain the nature of the threat itself. 
 Though Berlin does not explicitly claim to explain the logic of more policy minded Cold 
War intellectuals, his works were evidence of the kinds of concerns that occupied the mind of a 
Cold War liberal. Through his essays and lectures, Berlin articulated an intellectual framework 
behind why an antagonism to counteract the Soviet Union, such as that proposed by Kennan, was 
morally justified and necessary. Thus Berlin and Kennan can be thought of as complementary 
figures in Cold War thought. By examining Berlin’s moral and political thinking as a necessary 
accompaniment to Western actions during the Cold War, we gain a fuller understanding of the 
moral discourse that inspired the West’s perceived antagonism toward the Soviet Union.  
 Any student of the Cold War familiar with the Long Telegram would be familiar with the 
atmosphere of antagonism during the time. Indeed, Kennan’s 1946 Long Telegram and 1947 “X 
Article” have become part of a standard Cold War narrative. The catalyst for a series of 
sweeping changes in American foreign policy, the Long Telegram is regarded as a jolt to the 
senses of the Truman administration, which in Kennan’s mind had been lulled into complacency. 
Trying to alert Washington of the rising Soviet threat was, as Kennan described in his memoirs, 
“to all intents and purposes like talking to a stone. The Russian desk in the State Department had 
understood; and beyond it all had been an unechoing silence.”6 In foreign policy terms, the Long 
Telegram alerted American leaders of the need to prepare for increasingly antagonistic relations 
that would follow the post-war hangover. Kennan was alarmed by the rise of a Soviet Union 
whose leadership, he claimed, understood global political relations to be defined by “the innate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 George Kennan, Memoirs, vol 1, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 293.  
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antagonism between capitalism and Socialism,” despite the years of co-operation between 
nations of both economic systems during the Second World War.7  
 Reading into Soviet interpretations of Marxist ideology as put forth by its official 
propaganda machine, Kennan warned that the Soviets would treat capitalism as an injustice and 
were determined to seek its destruction.8 In this context, the Long Telegram was Kennan’s 
anticipatory response to a coming era of Soviet Policy that was to be preoccupied with advancing 
its own relative strength while simultaneously diminishing the West’s. Against such a regime, 
Kennan argued, the capitalist world had to not only prevent communist encroachment, but also 
actively look for opportunities to weaken the Soviet state.9  
 In the “X Article,” Kennan famously warned: “it is clear that the United States cannot 
expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet régime. It must 
continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena,” emphasizing 
the nature of the American-Soviet relationship as chiefly political.10 In seeking political solutions 
to what he perceived as a political problem, Kennan did not clearly spell out exactly why Soviet 
communism was so awful, dangerous, and above all, hostile to the West. To reiterate, Kennan’s 
concern was for the presence of the fear and how to deal with it, not whether it was merited or 
rational. In more detail and with greater nuance, Kennan recognized the existence of fear and 
anxiety in the West and prescribed a solution of vigilance and self-assured strength. However, he 
failed to properly explain either the cause of the fear or the motivations behind the need for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25 no. 4 (Jul. 1947), 572. 
George Kennan, “The Kennan ‘Long Telegram,’” in Kenneth Jensen, ed., Origins of the Cold War: 
The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts ‘Long Telegrams’ of 1946 (Washington: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1993), 19-20.  
8 Kennan, “Long Telegram,” in Origins of the Cold War, 17.  
9 Ibid., 30-31.  
10 George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25 no. 4 (Jul. 1947), 580.  
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resistance. For an explanation of the origins of Cold War fear and the rationale behind the moral 
imperative to stand up to the Soviet Union, Isaiah Berlin’s work is of much greater relevance.  
 Berlin’s political thinking revealed the interests and motivations behind Western policies 
from an ideological perspective that delved deeper than a dispute over methods of economic 
production—of capitalism and socialism—as Kennan’s Long Telegram alone might have 
suggested. Berlin was critical of the Soviet tendency to treat history as a science with objective 
laws and to disregard the desires and interests of individuals.11 Berlin’s Cold War anxieties were 
moral in nature and were shared by Kennan in correspondence between the two, though Kennan 
did not acknowledge as much in his Long Telegram.12 Berlin was instrumental in defining and 
articulating the scope and nature of the “cold war” that characterized American-Soviet relations 
as a moral tension within the relationship of political unease defined by Kennan. To understand 
Berlin’s moral critique of the Soviet Union adds an intellectual perspective to the Cold War and 
explains how particular intellectual currents played important roles in shaping the antagonism in 
the American-Soviet relationship.  
 This thesis is not the first to regard the Cold War as an unusual human conflict or original 
in arguing that its antagonists did not primarily engage in material warfare. It seeks to argue that 
though proxy wars did exist, at the heart of the conflict was not a dispute over life, property, 
wealth, the right to rule, or any other manner of material objectives, but a fundamental rift in the 
understanding of political theory and its epistemology. The basic rationale for the Cold War that 
this thesis argues is not immediately obvious to the casual historian accustomed to understanding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Berlin, “Marxist Versus Non-Marxist Ideas in Soviet Policy,” 6, in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS 
Berlin 569, fol. 103. 
12 In a letter to Berlin, Kennan took issue with the Soviet “undertaking to manipulate human nature,” 
showing moral concern similar to Berlin’s. Quoted from Princeton University Library, Department of 
Rare Books and Special Collections, Public Policy Papers, George F. Kennan Papers, Letter from 
Kennan to Berlin, 19 Jun 1951, 2. 
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political conflicts in material terms. However, it was not possible for the Western world to 
perceive of the USSR as an enemy in the traditional, material sense alone, especially given that 
the two sides had been recent allies in the bloodiest war the world had witnessed. The initial 
uncertainty, even at the highest levels of the US government, regarding what was to become of 
the United States and Western Europe’s relationship to the Soviet Union showed that antagonism 
was not inevitable or immediately obvious to Western political leaders. For the liberal West, the 
conflict with the Soviets, the “war” which makes the “Cold War,” was informed by, among other 
factors, the intellectual and moral perceptions of the Soviet Union fashioned by thinkers such as 
Isaiah Berlin. This is not to say that Cold War intellectuals began or caused it, but rather that 
they articulated the underlying sentiment beneath the political and diplomatic tensions. In doing 
so, the same intellectuals helped to shape and define the Cold War, and became participants in it.  
 Thus the Cold War was about ideas in the most basic sense, such that capitalism and 
communism as opposing political theories only represented the very surface of the conflict. The 
Cold War was not merely fought over modes of production, or of social organization, it was a 
dispute over the very way truth and human purpose were understood to affect morality. While 
the material threat of a growing Soviet state was real, it was complemented by intellectual and 
moral challenges of the Soviet system. Soviet political philosophy offered an epistemological 
framework threatening intellectual foundations that thinkers in a long tradition of Anglo-
American and liberal European political theory held dear.  
 Berlin, who felt himself part of a tradition of liberal political thought, felt obliged to 
respond, and in doing so he aligned intellectual patterns along nationalist lines, reconciling the 
ideological and political aspects of the Cold War that were not immediately related. However, 
the Cold War was more than a nationalist conflict, where the West simply saw the Soviets as a 
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threat because they were foreign. The Cold War cannot be simply understood in the conventional 
wisdom of “us” versus “them,” because that is not why intellectuals like Berlin viewed the 
Soviet Union as such a danger. The Soviet Union was dangerous because its political theories, 
and its basic moral philosophy stemmed out of an understanding of human history that 
intellectuals of the liberal Western tradition found to be indefensibly false and corrupt.  
*** 
 This thesis challenges the notion of the academic as a neutral observer by regarding 
Isaiah Berlin as an active Cold War participant. In reformulating the intellectual’s role, this paper 
looks to add a new perspective to the Cold War and another element in how it is defined and 
conceived as a conflict. The objective of such a project is to understand why the West came to 
perceive the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a serious threat following World War II from 
an intellectual’s perspective. While recognizing the relevance and reality of the Cold War as a 
material conflict, this paper assigns vital importance to the epistemological and moral aspects of 
the Cold War to show that many of its stakes were in ideas. By looking into the life and works of 
one of the twentieth century’s most influential Western intellectuals, this thesis hopes to uncover 
the underlying moral rationale behind one of the most peculiar conflicts in modern history from 
the perspective of one of its actors.  
 Berlin did not explicitly articulate his conception of the Cold War as an intellectual 
conflict, as this paper suggests. However, it would be an injustice to his works to treat them as 
mere abstract theories of ideas or political philosophy. Rather, they reflect the fears, interests, 
and mood of a specific time and place. Berlin, more than anyone, was aware that ideas, 
especially political and moral ones, had material consequences and potential bearing on 
historical events. To understand Berlin is to grasp the mindset of a Cold War liberal, who in 
Zhang 10 
trying to explain and warn against the dangers of Soviet Communism also underwent a thorough 
self-examination.   
 Chapter one examines Berlin’s engagement with nineteenth century Russian literature 
and ideas, setting up Berlin’s approach to the Cold War in order to ultimately understand his 
critique of Soviet political theory. Chapter two discusses Berlin’s understanding of national 
culture to argue that he severed his opposition to the Soviet Union from a broader civilizational 
conflict with Russia. Specifically, chapter two argues that Berlin made his challenge to Soviet 
epistemology in his famous defense of value pluralism, which demanded a revision to twentieth 
century liberalism. Chapter three focuses on the Cold War consequences for the intellectual, 
asserting that the redefined battlefields of an intellectual conflict entailed that intellectuals 
themselves participate as warriors.  
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Historiography 
 Central to this project is the concept of the Cold War, what it is and how historians have 
understood it. Though the Cold War is a term universally familiar in today’s historical parlance, 
its use was not similarly universal contemporaneous to the events which the term describes, 
however they might be defined. The specific term is attributed to George Orwell who used it in 
an October 1945 article “You and the Atomic Bomb” to describe a potential state of world affairs 
where there exists “two or three monstrous super-states, each possessed of a weapon by which 
millions of people can be wiped out in a few seconds, dividing the world between them.”13 
Orwell’s primary concern in the article was to analyze the potential impact of the atomic bomb 
on the world’s geopolitical landscape following the Second World War. When Orwell’s article 
was first published, the atomic bomb had only been introduced to the public imagination only a 
few weeks prior when its destructive power was unleashed on Imperial Japan in wartime. While 
Orwell may have overstated the importance of the development of weapons in world affairs—he 
argued “it is a commonplace that the history of civilisation is largely the history of weapons”—
his vision of a world of superpower relations was enormously prescient.14 
 Orwell’s use of the term “Cold War” apparently went largely unnoticed at the time.15 The 
term came into widespread use at a later stage and only on the American side, to signal a 
“concept of warfare against the Soviet Union.”16 In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the term 
was not in formal parlance before the Gorbachev era.17 Since Orwell’s article, both before and 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term has often been adopted in the academic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 George Orwell, “You and the Atomic Bomb,” in The Complete Works of George Orwell, vol. 17, I 
Belong to the Left (London: Random House, 1986), 320.  
14 Ibid., 319.  
15 Anders Stephanson, “Fourteen Notes on the Very Concept of the Cold War,” H-Diplo (2005), 4. 
16 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.  
17 Ibid.  
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community, at least in the English-speaking world, to describe the state of global political affairs 
dominated by relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.  
The view of the Cold War as a primarily political and diplomatic conflict is shared 
among historians of many persuasions. One proponent of this Orwell-inspired definition of the 
term “Cold War” is Odd Arne Westad, who in his book The Global Cold War gives the 
definition as “the period in which the global conflict between the United States and the Soviet 
Union dominated international affairs, roughly between 1945 and 1991.”18 This definition, or 
some very similar derivative, is also used by John Lewis Gaddis in his book The Long Peace: 
Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. For Gaddis, the American perception of the Soviet 
threat was a material one, concerned with the upsetting of traditional balances of power in global 
affairs and the rising danger of military conflict, atomic or otherwise.19 In another of Gaddis’ 
books, The Cold War: A New History, he merely adds that “the Cold War was fought at different 
levels in dissimilar ways in multiple places over a very long time” acknowledging complexities 
but not altering the Cold War’s defining features.20 While Westad and Gaddis offer vastly 
different interpretations of the Cold War, its origins, and geopolitical centers, they agree on the 
basic premise of the Cold War as a geopolitical conflict.  
 Though helpful as a means of situating the Cold War into a concise and bounded 
historical timeframe, the notion of the Cold War as merely describing a historical period marked 
by political conflict between the two great powers is insufficient. It does not adequately answer 
major questions of motivations and interests. Neither does it make clear when either side came to 
perceive the other as a threat or whether the feeling was mutual, let alone how and why the state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid. 
19 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), 20-48. 
20 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), xi.  
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of antagonism came to be. By conceiving of the conflict in political or diplomatic terms, histories 
of the Cold War such as those by Gaddis or Westad attribute Cold War fears as a mutually 
shared sense of existential threat, without delving further into either side’s psychology and 
thinking. As was the case beginning with Orwell, potential atomic destruction occupied a 
significant portion of the imagination of scholars such as Gaddis or Westad, and though their 
analysis of the Cold War was far more complex, they do not delve deeply enough into the 
conflict’s intellectual history to involve a figure such as Berlin as a participant in the conflict.  
 A more deliberate definition of the “Cold War” is required to understand Berlin in its 
context and more importantly to understand the Cold War as a concept through Berlin’s lens. 
Anders Stephanson provides such an examination of the idea and definition of the Cold War in 
his essay “Fourteen Notes on the Very Concept of the Cold War.” Stephanson’s essay is a 
compilation of provisional notes in which the author attempts to discuss the problems with the 
“conception” and “periodization” of what historians mean when they refer to the “Cold War.”21  
 Though inspired by a series of debates on the “periodization” of the Cold War, 
Stephanson’s essay focuses more importantly on the problem of the Cold War’s “conception.” 
By “periodization,” Stephanson refers to historians’ ability to define a conceptual beginning and 
end to the Cold War, to put dates on the matter. To answer the question of periodization is 
impossible, Stephanson notes, because upon doing so we quickly reveal “the extent to which the 
concept of the cold war is radically ‘under-determined.’”22 As such, Stephanson embarks on an 
attempt to determine the conception of the notion of “war” itself; that is to say, what it actually 
was, how it could be defined against peace, and how it begins and ends.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Stephanson, “Fourteen Notes,” 1. 
22 Ibid. 
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 The fourteen points that make up the body of Stephanson’s essay begin with a tongue in 
cheek analysis of the Cold War in the fictional eyes of Ian Fleming’s James Bond and John le 
Carre’s Alec Leamas, whose caricatured views are of a clear battle between the good liberals and 
evil communists. Stephanson subsequently turns from the localized Cold War itself to broader 
and more ancient notions of war and peace as understood by thinkers as early as Saint Augustine 
and Thomas Aquinas before turning back to Franklin Roosevelt and Kennan among other 
primary actors in the Cold War era. Stephanson’s conclusion is twofold “(i) the cold war was a 
US project, and (ii) its nature or logic was laid out (unintentionally) by Franklin D. Roosevelt 
during the 1939-1941 [sic] and epitomized later in the notion of ‘unconditional surrender.’”23  
 Roosevelt’s definition of war, Stephanson argues, borrowed from Augustine who defined 
and derived war in terms of its goal of peace.24 Whatever was not a true peace, a pax vera, was 
war. So long as a true enemy existed, a pax vera was impossible.  
Once, on closer inspection, it turned out that the Soviet Union did not fit 
positively the bill of a true friend, it could logically only be a true enemy, not an 
equal enemy of the duellist kind but an absolute enemy with whom there could be 
no real peace, only a peace, in Augustinian terms, “not worthy even of the name 
of peace.”25 
Roosevelt’s conception of the United States’ relationship with the Soviet Union thus introduces a 
problem with the term “Cold War” that as Stephanson points out, is “both a metaphor and not a 
metaphor,” because its meaning “hovers uncertainly between war and war-like. Absolute 
hostility, the antithesis of peace, is coupled with the absence of a real war.” 26 The lack of combat 
makes the adjective “cold” an appropriate modifier for the noun “war.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid., 3. 
24 Ibid., 7. 
25 Ibid., 17. 
26 Ibid., 19. 
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 Stephanson’s “Fourteen Notes” sets up a useful framework for thinking about the Cold 
War as a conflict, or equally as a non-conflict. Specifically, his conception of the Cold War sets 
up a significantly broader definition by stating that:  
the cold war is war-like in every sense except the military. Its truth is ‘war for 
unconditional surrender’ but the reality is the kind of war one has when war itself 
is impossible. It is war as an ideological, political and economic claim to 
universality, taking place not in the two-dimensional space of traditional battles 
but mediated through other realms when not, as universality, actually eliminating 
space altogether.27 
By accounting for how the Cold War could still be conceived of as a war without military 
conflict, Stephanson not only makes up for the shortcomings of defining the Cold War only in 
political or diplomatic terms, but provides a useful schematic for looking at it in a new historical 
light. Using Stephanson’s conception of the Cold War, this thesis will examine the intellectual’s 
role in fashioning the conflict. Building on Stephanson’s analysis, this thesis will explain how it 
was that intellectuals, such as Isaiah Berlin, came to be positioned at the heart of the Cold War 
conflict and how they played a central role in it. 
 While political or diplomatic histories tend to overlook the importance of the 
intellectual’s work as a central motivator of what came to be perceived as a conflict, few 
intellectual histories or biographies adequately explain the role of the academic—the ivory tower 
intellectual—in the context of the Cold War. The most famous example of the intellectual as 
Cold War participant, and a major focus of Cold War historians, is George Kennan. The 
literatures on Kennan and the policy ramifications of the Long Telegram are far too extensive to 
be summarized in a few sentences. However, the fascination with Kennan tends to stem out of 
the tendency to conceive of the Cold War in primarily political or diplomatic terms.28 Thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid., 20. 
28 I do not wish to imply that all studies of Kennan show this tendency to conceive of the Cold War 
as a political or diplomatic conflict. I simply wish to point out that the perception of Kennan as 
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Kennan is typically regarded as a Cold War actor through his contributions during his time and 
in his official capacity at the State Department. 
 A “pure” intellectual such as Isaiah Berlin is seldom studied specifically as participant of 
and a lens to Cold War history. Biographies of Berlin and analysis of his work in various fields 
exist to understand and examine his thought from many angles. However, their acknowledged 
purpose is typically to understand Berlin, his mind, and thoughts, not to make sense of the Cold 
War. Often, Berlin scholarship will use the Cold War as a backdrop to contextualize and situate 
Berlin’s work within specific historical circumstances. Michael Ignatieff’s biography of Isaiah 
Berlin is an especially strong example of such scholarship. While enormously informative in 
helping students and critics of Berlin understand his thinking and frame of mind, works such as 
Ignatieff’s biography are of little use in reverse: in trying to understand the Cold War from the 
perspective of the intellectual.29  
 One useful work of Berlin scholarship is George Crowder’s book Isaiah Berlin: Liberty 
and Pluralism. In that work, Crowder provides an interpretation of Berlin’s focus on the threat of 
Soviet Communism that sets up crucial concepts for the writing of this thesis. In the third chapter 
titled “The Betrayal of Freedom,” Crowder illustrates the extent to which Berlin was a “Cold 
Warrior” whose penetrating criticism of Soviet political theory came alongside an equally salient 
commentary on the limits of the	  dominant	  political	  theories of the West.30 Using sources 
mostly from Berlin’s published essays and articles from the 1950s, Crowder links Berlin’s attack 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
predominantly an influencer of policy is consistent with a view of the Cold War through a political or 
diplomatic lens.  
29 A similar critique can be made of Claude Galipeau’s Isaiah Berlin’s Liberalism and Joshua 
Cherniss’ A Mind and Its Time: The Development of Isaiah Berlin’s Political Thought. This view is 
also true of various volumes of essays dedicated to understanding Berlin’s work including Edna 
Margalit and Avishai Margalit’s Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration, George Crowder and Henry Hardy’s 
The One and the Many: Reading Isaiah Berlin, and Mark Lilla, Ronald Dworkin and Robert Silvers’ 
The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin.  
30 George Crowder, Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 51. 
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on Soviet Communism with its view of history. Generally accommodating toward Berlin’s work, 
Crowder’s explicit purpose is to “provide an accessible introduction” to Berlin’s thought that 
defends a particular interpretation of the same.31 That particular interpretation is a faithful and 
sympathetic one, largely seeking to frame Berlin’s work in a positive light, as Berlin himself saw 
it.  
 In his sympathy to Berlin, however, Crowder can be (and has been) criticized for 
allowing Berlin too much leeway and becoming too enamored and uncritical with his thought.32 
More importantly, Crowder sets his sights too narrowly. Though his analysis of Berlin’s thought 
adds enormous insight into Berlin’s state of mind and his motivations, Crowder does not extend 
his analysis far enough to spell out the Cold War implications of Berlin’s ideas from that time. 
Crowder points out that Berlin was “a declared opponent of ‘totalitarianism’”—an observation 
immediately obvious to anyone familiar with Berlin’s work—but stops short of adequately 
articulating how exactly Berlin understood the Soviet Union in Cold War terms.33 While 
Crowder’s work is of enormous use in identifying Berlin’s active role in the Cold War, his 
primary objective is to understand Berlin, not to gain an improved understanding of the Cold 
War.  
 This thesis builds on the notion of Berlin as a “Cold Warrior” insofar as it implies that he 
saw the Cold War as an intellectual conflict. By repositioning Berlin’s role to that of an active 
Cold War participant, this thesis aims to explicitly articulate elements of Berlin’s work obscure 
to even Berlin himself in order to understand the frame of mind that gripped the intellectual West 
during the Cold War.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid., ix.  
32 Chad Cyrenne, review of Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism, by George Crowder, Ethics 119, 
no. 1 (October 2008): 171.  
33 Crowder, 44.  
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Chapter One: An Intellectual Conception of the Soviet Union 
Nineteenth Century Origins of a Twentieth Century Problem 
 Berlin was abundantly familiar with the world of nineteenth century Russian ideas. This 
was the world of Herzen, Bakunin, Chernyshevsky, Gogol, Turgenev, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy, 
writers and thinkers whom Berlin wrote about often and referenced widely. They also influenced 
Berlin greatly, and like them he understood the importance and relevance of ideas in the material 
world.34 Recognizing their influence on him, Berlin defended and promoted nineteenth century 
Russian ideas in his role as one of the foremost academics reading and studying Russian 
literature and Russian thought in the English-speaking world.35 He championed Russian writers 
and sought to introduce them into literary discourse, in some cases being directly responsible for 
the publication and translation of Russian works in English.36 Many Russian thinkers and writers 
who were previously unknown to the English-speaking world owed their revived reputations to 
Berlin and many more—Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Turgenev among them—gained greater 
prominence because Berlin helped to keep them in the dominant intellectual and literary 
discourse.37 Yet by choosing who belonged in that discourse, Berlin would also shape the way 
nineteenth century Russian thought was represented outside Russia.  
 In defending and promoting particular Russian ideas, Berlin represented Russia as the 
Russia of its literature. By identifying a specific set of thinkers and writers as representative of 
the character of mid-nineteenth century Russia, Berlin added to their prominence. Thus figures 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Berlin, “The Pursuit of the Ideal,” in The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 3.  
35 David Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 157.  
36 Ignatieff, 209.  
37 Aileen Kelly, Introduction to Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers (New York: Viking Press, 1978), xiv. 
Mark Lilla also notes that Berlin “clearly enjoyed picking up the crumbling collected works of a half-
forgotten thinker, or one considered beyond the pale, and finding high philosophical drama in them.” 
Quoted from Foreword to Against the Current, xii.  
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like Dostoevsky and Tolstoy were more than writers, they were also the gatekeepers of the 
Russian conscience, a way for the rest of the world to access the Russian mind. To be sure, the 
same figures claimed to represent Russian thought and the right to speak for Russia and its 
culture—one only needs to read Dostoevsky or Turgenev to recognize their self-conscious 
claims.38 Yet right or wrong, Berlin fully sympathized with them and respected their authority to 
represent Russia as its intellectual elite. Berlin found great resonance in a paraphrased line he 
attributed to Korolenko, “My country is not Russia, my country is Russian literature.”39 Berlin 
took Korolenko to mean that Russian literature “was the natural home of what might be called 
self-conscious critical Russian thought.”40 It was out of sympathy to this predominantly view that 
Berlin helped to fashion a distinctly Russian identity that has since resonated with the English 
speaking-imagination.  
  This was the Russia diagnosed with an inferiority complex. This was the Russia that the 
West came to view as backward and out of sync with the rest of Europe; at the same time part of 
Metternich’s concert but also an oriental enigma. This was effectively an earlier version of the 
Russia that Kennan would write about in his “X Article,” as “frustrated, discontented, hopeless 
of finding self-expression.”41 
 In diagnosing Russia’s inferiority complex and projecting it to the English-speaking 
world, Berlin was well served by engaging with mid-nineteenth century Russian thought. He saw 
Russia’s role in defeating Napoleon at the beginning of the nineteenth century as a turning point 
in the history of Russia and of Europe. By successfully repelling Napoleon’s invasion, Berlin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Aileen Kelly, Introduction to Russian Thinkers, xiii.  
39 Berlin, “The Russian Preoccupation with History,” 5, in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Berlin 597, 
fol. 152. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25 no. 4 (Jul. 1947), 567.  
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argued, Russia had unwittingly and perhaps unintentionally announced its previously subdued 
presence in the European concert.42 In the ideas that occupied Russian intellectuals of the mid-
nineteenth century, Berlin identified a new starting point for Russian thought. The importance of 
the mid-nineteenth century intellectuals, for Berlin, was emphasized by their articulation of a 
worldview that Berlin ascribed as characteristic of a particularly Russian psyche at a time when 
Russian thought began to sprout out from the intellectual currents of Western Europe. Whereas 
the rest of Europe experienced a wave of liberal revolutions in 1848, Berlin argued “that the 
Liberal Revolution in Russia, comparable to 1848, did not occur until 1905—and then under 
very different circumstances, and, as the world knows, with very different results.”43 As such, 
another strand of Berlin’s work sought to identify a psychological state present in Russian 
thought from the mid-nineteenth century onward. 
 Russian intellectuals of the nineteenth century had, in Berlin’s view, a special 
preoccupation with history, unique among Western intellectual classes and unheard of in the 
other countries of Europe. In a number of works on the subject, the first of which surfaced at 
least as early as February 1952 at Haverford College in a lecture titled “Marxist Versus Non-
Marxist Ideas in Soviet Policy,” Berlin identified a peculiar Russian view of history that would 
become immensely influential to Soviet political philosophy.44 Subsequent to his February 1952 
lecture at Haverford, Berlin gave a seminar at Harvard in December 1962 titled “The Addiction 
of Russian Intellectuals to Historicism” and presented a radio broadcast for the BBC in 
December 1973 titled “The Russian Preoccupation with History.” The three lectures were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Berlin, “The Russian Preoccupation with History,” 3, in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Berlin 597, 
fol. 151.  
43 Berlin, “1848 in the History of Russian Thought,” 2, in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Berlin 426, 
fol. 3. 
44 Berlin, “Marxist Versus Non-Marxist Ideas in Soviet Policy,” 4, in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS 
Berlin 569, fol. 101. Given how widely Berlin lectured and how scattered records of his speeches and 
notes are, it is difficult to pinpoint a specific date of origin for this idea.  
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different iterations of the same argument, with the ideas revised and refined as time progressed. 
As the timing of his lectures suggests, Berlin’s interest in nineteenth century Russia thought 
stemmed from a desire to understand the origins of Soviet Policy.45 As such, Berlin’s various 
works on Russian intellectuals and their historicism were always composed as historical 
narratives. Yet history was not Berlin’s main concern. Rather, the historical narrative was merely 
a means of illustrating the thinking behind the precursor to Soviet policy. 
 After the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, Berlin posited, Russia was an underdeveloped 
country of illiterate peasants and Cossacks with a small intellectual class that looked to Western 
Europe for ideas. Berlin traced few, if any, remarkable ideas, ideas of primary importance to 
European intellectual life, to Russia. Rather Berlin saw Russian thinkers as having a tendency to 
import ideas from the West and to adopt them with an unusual fervor that amounted to 
fanaticism. For Berlin, the eagerness with which Russian thinkers received Western ideas also 
led them to profoundly alter them.46 Whether it was true that Russian intellectualism truly lacked 
originality was not certain even to Berlin who merely makes the claim based on a lack of 
evidence to prove otherwise. However, the narrative does, in Berlin’s mind, adequately explain 
why so many Russian intellectuals took on imported ideas with an unprecedented fanaticism.  
 Ahistorical as Berlin’s narrative may have been, his observations regarding Russians and 
historicism find evidence in prominent works of mid-nineteenth century Russian literature. The 
preoccupation with liberal reforms, the advancement of the Russian condition, status and 
freedom of the serfs, take a certain grip in the minds of prominent thinkers and writers of that 
period. Turgenev’s famous character Barazov from his novel Fathers and Children is a nihilist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The Harvard lecture can be found in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Berlin 581, fols. 1-22. The 
BBC Broadcast can be found in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Berlin 597, fols. 150-158. 
46 Berlin, “The Addiction of Russian Intellectuals to Historicism,” 2, in Oxford, Bodleian Library, 
MS Berlin 581, fol. 4. 
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primarily occupied with the advancement of human civilization through science and 
objectivity.47 Dostoevsky’s discussion of the relationship between liberal secularism and religion 
in promoting or impeding historical progress comes to a head in his celebrated “Grand 
Inquisitor” scene from Brothers Karamazov.48 Perhaps most famously, the issue of historical 
determination is an explicit theme in Tolstoy’s War and Peace, such that Tolstoy’s epilogue can 
be read as a desperate attempt to make sense of events that no knowable historical law can 
fathom.49  
 Out of moments in Russian literature such as these, Berlin created, or at least identified 
and unearthed, an inferiority complex inherent to a supposedly Russian psyche. Regardless of 
how many Russians self-consciously occupied such a state of mind, it was this state of mind that 
scholars of Russian literature, Berlin chief among them, would lead much of the rest of the world 
to believe.  
 Though the aesthetic value of such famous moments in Russian literature is indisputable, 
Western intellectuals such as Berlin contributed to their authors’ rise to prominence outside 
Russia by elevating them into a dominant ideological discourse as representatives of the Russian 
conscience. Literary though its origins might have been, the Russian state of mind that the West 
came to know nonetheless achieved broader prominence, as is evident in Kennan’s Long 
Telegram and “X Article,” materially affecting how the West came to perceive Russia 
politically. Thus the ideas that shaped the Russian mind in the mid-nineteenth century would 
play a central role in the later Cold War.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See Ivan Turgenev, Fathers and Children. 
48 See Fyodor Dostoevsky, Brothers Karamazov. 
49 See Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace. 
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The Romantic Influence 
 Among the ideas that became popular among an influential portion of nineteenth century 
Russian intellectuals, Berlin argued, were those of the German Romantic movement prevalent in 
Western Europe at the time.50 The exact details and nuances of the political theories originating 
in the German Romantic movement are beyond the scope and requirements of this thesis. For 
current purposes, it suffices to condense Berlin’s already stripped down summary of the central 
concepts of the Romantic movement to the idea “that every man and every human group, had 
some kind of goal for which in some sense it was created, some kind of end or mission to fulfill 
which was its very essence.”51 Berlin argued Russian intellectuals were introduced to this core 
concept of the Romantic Movement while living in a still medieval nation of barbarians, causing 
them to develop a feeling of inferiority among the more advanced nations of Europe. From this 
sense of inferiority, they subsequently became obsessed with the future and Russia’s destiny in 
it. This obsession, Berlin explained, lead to the fanaticism that was to be characteristic of and 
unique among Russian intellectuals beginning in the mid-nineteenth century.52  
 It was out of these unique intellectual conditions, according to Berlin, that Russian 
intellectuals developed a special preoccupation with the role of their nation and their people in 
history. Out of a feeling of national and cultural inferiority, there was an unusual urgency to 
understand what went wrong and what could explain Russia’s backwardness. Their assumption 
was: “If we can only discover what the pattern of history is, then we shall understand ourselves, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Berlin, “The Addiction of Russian Intellectuals to Historicism,” 4, in Oxford, Bodleian Library, 
MS Berlin 581, fol. 6. 




we understand where we belong, we understand what the next move is.”53 The group of 
intellectuals that came to take historicism seriously formed what Berlin called the 
“intelligentsia,” a term of Russian origin describing a Russian phenomenon of “a movement of 
educated, morally sensitive Russians stirred to indignation by an obscurantist Church; by a 
brutally oppressive State indifferent to the squalor, poverty and illiteracy in which the great 
majority of the population lived; by a governing class which they saw as trampling on human 
rights and impeding moral intellectual progress.”54 This group of writers and thinkers, Berlin 
argued, sought to improve Russia’s condition through intellectual inquiry. 
 Thus, according to Berlin, the Russian intelligentsia’s desire to discover historical 
patterns took inspiration from the success of the natural sciences.55  Trying to emulate Newton’s 
progress in physics, for example, a certain subset of historians and philosophers of history 
attempted to “extend historical knowledge to fill gaps in the past (and, at times, to build into the 
limitless gap of the future) by applying ‘scientific’ method.”56 While Berlin did not claim this 
phenomenon of attempting to make history a science to be original to Russia, he did argue that it 
was in Russia where thinkers grasped it with such a special fervor that the prospect of 
understanding history as a science took on a life of its own.57 It was this obsession with trying to 
understand history as a science, Berlin argued, which grew to inspire the main intellectual 
sentiments of the Russian Revolution and the creation of the USSR.58  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid., fol. 153v.  
54 Berlin, “The Survival of the Russian Intelligentsia,” in The Soviet Mind (Washington: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2004), 167.  
55 Berlin, “The Concept of Scientific History,” in Concepts and Categories (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013), 138. 
56 Berlin, “Historical Inevitability,” in Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 96.  
57 Berlin, “The Addiction of Russian Intellectuals to Historicism,” 22, in Oxford, Bodleian Library, 
MS Berlin 81, fol. 24. 
58 Berlin, “The Russian Preoccuption with History,” 16, in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Berlin 597, 
fol. 157v. 
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 The accuracy of Berlin’s narrative of nineteenth century Russian addiction to historicism 
is not only uncertain but also impossible to prove. Berlin’s account was thus less insightful for its 
historical accuracy than its description of a Russian state of mind. Berlin’s explanation of the 
Russian thought diagnosed a psychological sentiment in the country’s tradition and merely used 
historical narrative as a device to achieve that end. 
 Russia may have had thinkers who espoused original ideas. Likewise, the particular 
group of nineteenth century intellectuals in question may neither have felt culturally inferior to 
the rest of Europe nor intended to develop a preoccupation with historicism. However, these 
perceived moments in the history of Russian ideas helped Berlin to explain Russia’s 
psychological state then and the Soviet Union’s psychological state during the Cold War. 
Furthermore, these psychological states are merely what the West came to perceive through their 
own intellectuals, among them Berlin himself, who explained and defended them using analysis 
of Russia’s literature from the nineteenth century onward.  
 
The Soviet System 
 If indeed Russia had an inferiority complex as Berlin suggested, then the success of the 
Bolshevik Revolution was, if not inevitable, at least highly probable. Given the psychological 
condition of Russian intellectualism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Berlin 
argued that Marxism provided what the Bolsheviks saw as a natural solution to their problems.59 
The Russian state of mind that grew out of the desire to find Russia’s place in world history 
would eventually consume and digest Marxism, Berlin argued, with the same fanaticism that 
inspired the very desire to find historical laws in the first place. Berlin saw the fanatical adoption 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Isaiah Berlin, “Soviet Russian Culture,” in The Soviet Mind, 135.  
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of Hegelian conceptions of history governed by scientific laws as inspiring much self-absorbed 
questioning among the Russian intelligentsia. He also understood how subsequent generations of 
Russian intellectuals became attracted to Marxism as a remedy for their own insecurities. In a 
1957 essay for Foreign Affairs,60 Berlin wrote “Marxism contained all the elements which the 
young révoltés in Russia were looking for. It claimed to be able to demonstrate the proper goals 
of human existence in terms of a pattern of history of which there was 'scientific' proof.”61 It was 
as if by extension that Marxism became the self-prescribed cure for Russia’s inferiority complex.  
Thus Berlin’s logic regarding the psychological state of Russian intellectuals applied 
itself to explain the success of the Bolshevik Revolution. Russia was eager to find its place in the 
world and sought after a scientific explanation that would in turn provide solutions for a brighter 
future. Lenin, who Berlin claimed to have regarded Hegel “with the piety due to a direct 
ancestor,” leveraged Russia’s preexisting inferiority complex and took choice aspects of Marxist 
theory and distorted them for purposes specific to the Bolsheviks.62  
 On the one hand, a false idea took hold of a people whose imagination had been 
conditioned to be receptive to deceiving promises by almost a century of intellectual inquiry, as 
“the conditions of Russian life, which moulded both [Lenin] and it, in part created the need for 
religious certainty and messianic doctrine which Marxism provided.”63 On the other, Lenin took 
an already pliable idea, already riddled with a falseness that defies comprehension of the 
empirical observer, twisted and reformulated it to give it a life of its own and claimed it as the 
solution that would settle centuries of Russian insecurities. Yet the promise of a scientific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 This essay was originally published in two parts and has since been put together as it was 
originally written by Berlin’s editor Henry Hardy in a 2004 volume The Soviet Mind and given the 
title “Soviet Russian Culture.” I have chosen to use the edited version.  
61 Berlin, “Soviet Russian Culture,” in The Soviet Mind, 135.  
62 Berlin, “The Arts in Russia Under Stalin,” in The Soviet Mind, 13.  
63 Berlin, “Soviet Russian Culture,” in The Soviet Mind, 135. 
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solution to cure Russia’s insecurities was not all that Lenin and his comrades brought to the 
table, Berlin argued. Rather, Berlin suggested that Lenin’s original contribution was the 
authoritarian element, which differentiated Soviet Communism from its Marxist roots. Lenin’s 
contribution was “the conception of the Party as a sect ruled ruthlessly by its elders and 
demanding from its members the total sacrifice upon its altar of all that they most cherished.”64  
 The solution that Lenin and the Bolsheviks found for Russia’s psychological anxieties of 
the previous century deeply unsettled Berlin, who was critical of historical inevitability and the 
notion of history as a science to begin with.65 By standards acceptable to Western liberalism, 
Soviet thought was too attached to historicism and by extension to laws of historical 
determinism.66 Taken to its logical endpoints, any view of history as governed by scientific 
laws—whether Hegelian, Marxist, or an ill-begotten Soviet derivative of some combination of 
both—deprived the individual of free will and moral agency. Thus Soviet Communism as it was 
experienced in the twentieth century more than just violated liberal values of individual freedom, 
but rather rejected the very foundations of liberal political thought.  
The basic problem, for Berlin’s liberal affinities, was not merely that the Soviet regime 
was totalitarian and oppressive—though he did see it as both.67 Liberal political thought by 
definition opposed tyranny as working against freedom as a moral end. Yet, Berlin pointed out in 
“Two Concepts of Liberty” that autocracy may not inherently contradict traditional notions of 
freedom.68 Dictatorship was not the root of the problem, for if Stalin afforded his subjects 
political freedoms—meaning civil liberties—as a benevolent dictator could conceivably do, the 	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problems in the Soviet system would not have been solved. Heinous as the brutality and 
oppression of the Soviet regime were, totalitarianism and oppression were merely symptoms of a 
larger problem rooted in the fundamentals of the Soviet worldview, which misunderstood human 
purpose by altogether rejecting human agency. 
 Berlin’s moral philosophy, and that of his variety of liberalism, presupposed agency in 
the sense of having free will, and required autonomous individuals acting as independent moral 
beings. This assumption of free will was necessary to explain Berlin’s sympathy for Alexander 
Herzen’s notion that “the ultimate goal of life was life itself; that the day and the hour were ends 
in themselves, not a means to another day or another experience.69 Agency was an empirically 
observable state of being, important because it was factually obvious, not because it furthered 
some other end. Berlin rejected the Marxist notion—later to be adopted by the Soviets—that “the 
‘true’ (or ‘deeper’) causes of human behaviour lie not in the specific circumstances of an 
individual life or in the individual’s thoughts or volitions…but in a pervasive interrelationship 
between a vast variety of such lives with their natural and man-made environment.”70 By 
extension, morality, as it pertained to questions of political philosophy, became entirely 
predicated on the freedom of human beings to act as moral actors capable of bearing 
responsibility for their actions. For Berlin’s moral system to make sense, human beings must 
possess free will and the ability to act independently, unhindered by laws of history or other 
metaphysical forces. Yet the Soviets, Berlin argued, had rejected this very basic premise of 
empirical observation in their efforts to “squeeze the facts into a preconceived fashion” of 
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history.71 Not sharing foundational assumptions, Soviet Communism and liberalism stood no 
chance of mutual compatibility.  
Of human agency and free will, Berlin shared a similar position with Kennan. In an 
exchange of letters with his friend following the 1950 publication of his essay “Political Ideas in 
the Twentieth Century,” Berlin revealed just how his and Kennan’s ideas resonated together. 
Inspired by Kant’s assertion that men were “ends in themselves” and Kennan’s enthusiastic 
response to his essay, Berlin wrote that a fundamental premise of Western civilization according 
to liberal thought was the notion that, 
every human being is assumed to possess the capacity to choose what to do, and 
what to be, however narrow the limits within which his choice may lie, however 
hemmed in by circumstances beyond his control; that all human love and respect 
rests upon the attribution of conscious motives in this sense; that all the 
categories, the concepts, in terms of which we think about and act towards one 
another… all this becomes meaningless unless we think of human beings as 
capable of pursuing ends for their own sakes by deliberate acts of choice—which 
alone makes nobility noble and sacrifices sacrifices.72 
It follows from Berlin’s logic that arbitrary rule, limitations on speech, and the suppression of 
thought—all considered among the most heinous consequences of Stalin and his regime—were 
only manifestations of a more fundamental problem in the Soviet understanding of the 
mechanisms of history. These terrible consequences were merely the product of political theories 
corrupted, abused, and appropriated by the Soviet system beginning with Lenin. None of the dire 
consequences of the fanatical Soviet experiment with Marxism were the cause of its error. The 
cause, rather, lay in the way in which the Soviet system of thought believed history to work, 
which ruled out the very possibility of free will.  
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 Berlin’s problem with the Soviet regime and its way of thinking was thus not just that it 
deprived human beings of freedom through autocratic government. Rather Berlin objected to the 
Soviet rejection of human agency and moral responsibility along Marxist lines and its attempt to 
actualize the effects in the Soviet Union’s political reality.73 The root of the problem was in how 
the Soviet system, through its belief in the metaphysical laws of human history, deprived human 
beings—not just Soviet subjects, but all human beings—of an inherent dignity in their moral 
agency. 
 For Berlin, the horror of the Soviet distortion of Marxist morality extended even further 
than the fact that its political apparatus deprived human beings of agency. The Soviet worldview 
and its implicit political theory turned human beings from ends into means. Where historical 
laws were presupposed to exist, there could be no room for human beings as spontaneous, free, 
and independent moral agents. Rather human beings were reduced to being the raw material 
which history acted on in the same way that atoms were acted on by physics and chemistry. 
Fanatically enamored with the prestige of the sciences and their claim to natural truths, the 
Soviet regime restructured the concept of the society along scientific lines,  
the values of which derive not from the desires or the moral sense of this or that 
individual’s view of his ultimate ends but from some factual hypothesis or 
metaphysical dogma about history, or race, or national character in terms of which 
the answers to the question what is good, right, required, desirable, fitting can be 
‘scientifically’ deduced, or intuited, or expressed in this or that kind of behavior.74 
To Berlin, this pseudo-scientific element of Soviet political theory was not adequately described 
as morally reprehensible or aesthetically repugnant, it was utterly incoherent, it was false, it 
demeaned human beings and stripped away their status as autonomous moral agents, and it 	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simply lacked a truth plainly evident in empirical experience. Consequently, this ideologically 
driven means of understanding global events translates into what both Berlin and Kennan 
identify as the Soviet regime’s irresponsiveness to fact.75  
 Lacking moral agency, Berlin feared that human beings would merely become the base 
matter of history, useful not for their own ends but liable to be discarded into Marx’s so called 
“rubbish heap of history” when they were no longer of use.76 As such, Soviet political theory 
missed an essential observational truth of what Berlin understood to be human. This is what 
Berlin meant when he so frequently warned against Saint-Simon’s prophesy about “replacing the 
government of people with the administration of things,” an idea later abused by Stalin to term 
intellectuals as “engineers of human souls.”77 In rejecting the validity of the individual’s moral 
agency, the Soviets’ flawed view of history was offensive to the most elementary features of 
Berlin’s liberal conception of the world. For the Soviet system, Hegel and Marx were icons 
because they articulated a scientific interpretation of history; for Berlin, the same reason made 
“Hegel and Marx such monstrous traitors to our civilization.”78 
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Chapter Two: A Counter-Enlightenment Liberal’s Response 
The Influence of Nationalism in the Cold War 
 Berlin was not a fervent nationalist given that he saw the nation as a modern creation and 
was not normatively attached to its existence. Nonetheless, he appreciated the extraordinary 
breadth and influence of nationalism in the world. “The need to belong to an easily identifiable 
group” was a natural human desire, Berlin argued, “as necessary to human existence as the need 
for food or shelter, security or procreation.”79 Though the underlying desire to belong need not be 
expressed in the form of nationalism, for Berlin, as it was for Aristotle, some form of social 
group bounded by “common ancestry, common language, customs, traditions, memories, 
continuous occupancy of the same territory for long periods of time” had always been necessary 
throughout history—beginning with basic collective units such as families, clans, and tribes.80 
Modern nationalism, Berlin argued, had merely been elevated “into a conscious doctrine, at once 
the product, articulation and synthesis of states of consciousness that ha[d] been recognised by 
social observers as a force and a weapon.”81  
 However, the Cold War’s intellectual conflict was not rooted in disputes traditionally 
associated with nationalistic warfare—security, sovereignty, and pride of a nation and its people, 
for example. However, Berlin’s understanding of national culture, as created by a distinct way of 
thinking, necessarily, albeit probably unintentionally, aligned intellectual and nationalist 
concerns. Culture and nationalism were inseparable for Berlin, who argued “men are not self-
created: they are born into a stream of tradition, above all of language, which shape[d] their 	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thoughts and feelings, which they cannot shed or change, which form[ed] their inner life."82 
Though not necessarily an essentialist view of national culture, Berlin’s view implied at the very 
least that cultures maintained distinct and identifiable traditions, patterns, and characteristics. 
Thus an impinging factor of Berlin’s Cold War outlook was his national and cultural allegiance.  
Though Berlin was born in Riga while it was still part of Imperial Russia to parents of 
Jewish ancestry, he showed an unmistakable self-consciousness of his political and cultural 
loyalty to England. “I confess to a pro-British bias,” Berlin said in 1979, “I was educated in 
England, and have lived there for sixty years: all that I have been and done and thought is 
indelibly English. I cannot judge English values impartially, for they are part of me.”83 England 
to Berlin was the embodiment of an intellectual tradition, the homeland of thinkers who Berlin 
considered his intellectual predecessors —Hobbes, Hume, Locke, Smith, Bentham, Mill. Thus he 
was especially susceptible to embracing England’s intellectual tradition of liberalism as part of 
its national myth. In claiming the liberal tradition as England’s and his own, Berlin introduced a 
nationalist divide into a Cold War conflict that was primarily intellectual in origin. Of the 
English values that he saw as his own, Berlin said, 
I count this as the greatest of intellectual and political good fortunes. They are the 
basis of what I believe: that decent respect for others and the toleration of dissent 
is better than pride and a sense of national mission: that liberty may be 
incompatible with, and better than, too much efficiency; that pluralism and 
untidiness are, to those who value freedom, better than the rigorous imposition of 
all embracing systems, no matter how rational and disinterested, better than the 
rule of majorities against which there is no appeal. All this is deeply and uniquely 
English, and I freely admit that I am steeped in it, and cannot breathe freely save 
in a society where these values are, for the most part, taken for granted.84 
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In arguing that a common intellectual tradition was an essential binding force of twentieth 
century nationalism, Berlin implicitly identified a degree of unity between European nations by 
way of their common intellectual traditions.  
Berlin had a tendency to discuss the “Western tradition” of political thought in “central 
concepts” beginning with the Greeks and in doing so, implied some kind of unity that the British 
intellectual tradition shared with the rest of Europe and even the United States by looking to 
Plato and Homer as its forefathers.85 To distinguish individual cultures from within the bigger 
European whole, Berlin turned to his interpretation of Giambattista Vico, the father of “the 
modern concept of culture.”86  
From Vico, Berlin understood that culture “lies in the past experience of the human race, 
which, from its earliest origins, may be read in its mythology, its language, its social and 
religious institutions,” and in doing so extracted particular strands of thought and attributed their 
origins and ownership to groups of intellectuals along particular national, linguistic, or cultural 
lines.87 It was owing to this conception of ideas as the product of particular cultures that Berlin 
was able to attribute the Enlightenment to the French, Romanticism to the Germans, and 
Empiricism to the British. Russian thought from the mid-nineteenth century still vaguely 
belonged within European intellectual currents, Berlin argued, but had begun to branch out and 
take on a life of its own.88 The division was not complete, however, until the Bolshevik 
Revolution severed Soviet political thought from the European mainstream entirely.  
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By identifying Lenin’s ideas as the product of a fanatical interpretation of Marxist 
thought largely divorced from Marxism itself, Berlin distinguished Soviet thought after the 
Bolshevik Revolution from its Russian predecessor and established a clear break between the 
two. In part, Berlin managed to establish a break because he had a firm understanding of Russian 
ideas from the nineteenth century to begin with. His confidence in his interpretation of earlier 
Russian thought provided a yardstick with which to contrast the results of the Bolshevik 
Revolution. The 1917 revolution, Berlin argued, deviated from previous patterns of Russian 
thinking and “did not follow the lines that most of [the mid-nineteenth century] writers and 
talkers had anticipated.”89 While the Russian addiction to historicism began in the mid-nineteenth 
century, Bolshevik fanaticism was of a different scale and yielded a different kind of intellectual 
dialogue, entirely unattached to European ideas.  
 
The Cleavage Between Russian and Soviet Ideas 
 Berlin’s distinction between Russian ideas of the nineteenth century and Soviet 
intellectualism following the Bolshevik revolution must be understood from his own position in 
relation to both. Berlin saw himself as an Englishman, albeit with roots in Russia, but most 
essentially as part of a long tradition of liberal minded British empiricism. From such a 
perspective, Russian ideas in the nineteenth century, although unique among European 
intellectual developments, were nonetheless attached to ideas that had originated in the European 
mainstream—from the French Enlightenment and German Romantic movement predominantly. 
Soviet Communism, with its racial Bolshevik innovations was altogether too different to be 
considered part of European intellectualism. More than simply having a falsely conceived 
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epistemology and a mistaken view of human agency, Soviet thought and its fanaticism spun off 
intellectual currents that belonged in a category of their own, not just distinct from Europe, but 
separate from its Russian roots as well.  
For example, the origins of authoritarianism in the Soviet Union began, according to 
Berlin, with Lenin, whose authoritarian element was a novel addition not found in the Marxist or 
Hegelian theories of Europe. In its own fanatical way, Berlin argued, the Lenin-led Bolshevik 
revolution spun itself off from Marxism entirely, and in doing so severed its links to its European 
roots. “It was its own conception of itself that divided Bolshevism so sharply from its parent, 
Western Marxism—a conception which made it a set of political or social or economic beliefs or 
policies, but a way of life, all-penetrating and compulsory, controlled absolutely by the Party or 
the Central Committee in a way for which little authority can be found even in the most extreme 
pronouncements of Marx or Engels.”90 Unlike Dostoevsky or Tolstoy’s ideas, which could still 
be considered part of the European dialogue, Soviet ideas were isolated from Europe entirely.  
In portraying Soviet political ideology as separate from a previous culture of Russian 
thinking, Berlin differentiated the Cold War’s ideological conflict between Soviet Communism 
and liberalism from a deeper nationalist conflict between Russia and the nations of Western 
Europe. The implication of the distinction was that while the Cold War still occurred within a 
predominantly nationalist paradigm, the extent of the nationalist conflict only included recent 
developments in the Soviet Union and not deeply rooted and irreconcilable characteristics of 
Russian culture. In cleaving the Soviet Union away from its Russian roots, Berlin aligned the 
Cold War’s political and intellectual conflict within existing national divisions while avoiding a 
broader clash of cultures or civilizations.  
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A Liberal’s Critique of Liberalism 
 In response to the rise of Soviet political thought, Berlin turned his attention to 
developing a critique of what he called the Western utopian vision. This critique was his defense 
of value pluralism. Despite publishing most of work on pluralism toward the end of his career, 
Berlin had exhibited significant traces of his defense of value pluralism throughout his career. In 
the context of the Cold War, it can be seen as both an attempt to invalidate the political theory 
underpinning Soviet Communism and a twentieth century revision of liberalism made to 
sufficiently differentiate it from the Soviet thought he was opposing. The consequence of 
Berlin’s critique of the utopian ideal was not only an assault on Soviet thought and Stalin’s 
implementation of it in the USSR, but a self-conscious questioning of fundamental questions 
concerning the Western liberal tradition that Berlin saw as his own. 
 Berlin’s system of value pluralism, as an alternative to the utopian ideal, has been one of 
the landmark achievements of twentieth century thinking, sparking, as the American philosopher 
Ronald Dworkin put it, “immediate, continuing, heated and mainly illuminating controversy.”91 
To Berlin’s liberal self-examination and its contribution to twentieth century political 
philosophy, this thesis has little to add, but it is nonetheless necessary to summarize it in relation 
to the Cold War for present purposes. Most germane to Berlin and the Cold War were the flawed 
fundamental assumptions that Western liberalism shared with Soviet Communism. First, an 
attachment to a kind of ideal known to Western thought since Plato.92 Second, the common faith 
in French Enlightenment rationalism, the idea that reason would lead mankind to the Platonic 
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ideal.93 Berlin’s critique of the utopian dream, as an aspiration of Soviets and liberals alike, and 
the rationalism that promised to lead mankind to it, can be summarized as follows: 
 Inspired by a very old dream of a perfect society, the Western utopian vision was a 
misguided hope prevalent in the core of Western political thinking.94 The dream took on more 
than one form, and much ink—and blood—had been spilt endeavoring to discover which one 
was the true vision and just how to achieve it. Conceptions of the utopia varied wildly. For some 
it was a remnant of the ancient past—as in the biblical Garden of Eden in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition—for others, it was merely an optimistic view of the future—as Hegel might have 
conceived of the end of history—for many others, it was nothing more than a useful 
philosophical ideal created to make a point—as for Plato or Kant. Regardless of whether men 
could actually hope to realize the dream and reach utopia in the form of some earthly paradise, 
few thinkers of the Western tradition—and until Machiavelli, virtually no major thinker—were 
willing to let go of the possibility altogether.95  
 As it concerned Berlin during the Cold War, the utopian ideal was a shared dream both of 
the Soviets and the Western liberals. The Soviet view of historical determinism was a corruption 
of Marxist ideas and conceived of metaphysical laws with a teleological end—a utopia—and a 
vision of how to change men and society to arrive there.96 As much as Western liberals disagreed 
with the path Soviet Communism proposed to take to reach that goal, they aspired to a common 
objective informing a better society.97  
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 Regardless of how vehemently the two sides disagreed about the means to improving 
society, the objective was the same and the technique and the means were those of rationalism.98 
Taking inspiration from the French Enlightenment, both Soviet Communism and Western 
democratic liberalism, as they had come to be understood in the twentieth century, became 
similarly attached to the belief that intelligent men who could apply reason had the means to 
solve all problems, especially ones of great moral or political significance.99 Their difference was 
in means, not end goals; their concerns were technical—asking how to achieve the end goal—not 
moral—asking what the end goal entailed. While the Soviets may have interpreted that basic 
premise with more fanaticism and were more willing and enthusiastic to infringe upon and 
violate the “sacrosanctity of the person” to achieve their desired society, liberals themselves did 
not claim different ends.100    
 For Berlin, the danger to the conviction that in rationality lay the solution to all problems 
was not only the mistaken belief that utopia was achievable, but that mankind would know how 
to achieve it. “For if one really believes that such a solution is possible, then surely no cost 
would be too high to obtain it: to make mankind just and happy and creative and harmonious for 
ever—what could be too high a price to pay for that?”101 Far from achieving a real earthly utopia, 
the utopian vision was far more likely to serve as justification for otherwise unthinkable things, 
Berlin argued. This was the rationale behind Berlin’s criticism of positive liberty, as it gave 
every “dictator, inquisitor, and bully” the justification for their brutality and authoritarianism. 
The utopian justification allowed the dictator to claim: “even though men suffer and die in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Isaiah Berlin, “Democracy, Communism and the Individual,” notes from a 1949 talk at Mount 
Holyoke College, Isaiah Berlin Virtual Library, 1, 
http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/lists/nachlass/demcomind.pdf. 
99 Berlin, “Political Ideas in the 20th Century,” 356.  
100 Ibid., 365.  
101 Berlin, “The Pursuit of the Ideal, “ from The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 16.  
Zhang 40 
process, they are lifted by it to a height to which they could never have risen without my 
coercive—but creative—violation of their lives.”102  
 Hitler’s excuse for the Holocaust came out of the pursuit of the utopian ideal—albeit a 
nasty, fascist one. Stalin, in Berlin’s mind, was no doubt capable of something similar. Yet, 
Berlin also recognized that the great liberal democracies of the West, in the most basic rationale 
of their liberalism, were in fact engaged in a similar pursuit. His worry was that to seek the ideal 
at all would hazard the danger of paying the price it claims to justify.  
 The fundamental fallacy Berlin found in the liberal project—the same fallacy as in the 
Soviet project—was the assumption that “men have a certain fixed, unfaltering nature, certain 
universal, common, immutable goals.”103 Within such political projects, oriented toward realizing 
the utopian dream, was the misguided notion that all good values are not only universally good, 
but also mutually compatible. Berlin’s value pluralism rejected this fundamental assumption of 
Enlightenment rationalism as incoherent. Instead value pluralism was “the conception that there 
are many different ends that men may seek and still be fully rational, fully men, capable of 
understanding each other and sympathising and deriving light from each other.”104  
 The rejection of an ultimate good struck at what for Berlin had become a common 
premise among disputants of all twentieth century political theory—that correct solutions to 
social problems would push human progress toward a utopian telos.105 In tenaciously but 
misguidedly clinging on to this assumption, the liberals were as guilty as Stalin, only they did not 
make a habit out of abusing it so brazenly for brutal and autocratic ends. For Berlin, the universal 
and eternal harmony of ultimate moral values was not just impossible but incoherent, whether 	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that harmony was liberal or communist in nature. Two values might be equally true and good, 
but they might also clash.  
 Take the tension between liberty and equality for example. Both, Berlin argued, “are 
among the primary goals pursued by human beings through many centuries; but total liberty for 
wolves is death to the lambs, total liberty of the powerful, the gifted, is not compatible with the 
rights to a decent existence of the weak and the less gifted.”106 Though liberty and equality have 
always been two of liberalism’s most cherished values, they did not necessarily co-exist in 
perfect harmony. Yet, the fact that they clash does totally unravel the premise of a liberal 
democracy. The two need only be recognized as distinct and a balance must be struck.  
Equality may demand the restraint of the liberty of those who wish to dominate; 
liberty—without some modicum of which there is no choice and therefore no 
possibility of remaining human as we understand the word—may have to be 
curtailed in order to make room for social welfare, to feed the hungry, to clothe 
the naked, to shelter the homeless, to leave room for the liberty of others, to allow 
justice or fairness to be exercised.107  
In seeking to demonstrate the absurdity of Soviet Communism, Berlin simultaneously pointed 
out an inherent fallacy in the liberal project. As to which critique came first, that was irrelevant. 
The two critiques are conceptually one and the same.  
Moreover, Berlin’s defense of value pluralism complemented his concern for recognizing 
the dignity and moral agency of the individual. In his defense of liberty as non-interference, the 
definition given by classical English political philosophers, Berlin is widely comparable to 
another Cold War intellectual in George Orwell.108 There is a striking degree of similarity in their 
approach to understanding the Cold War and reacting against Soviet Totalitarianism. Orwell’s 
1946 essay “Politics and the English language,” for example, was characteristic of his views on 	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the need for clarity in political speech.109 Where Orwell attacked what he saw as an increasing 
tendency to distort the meaning of words such that their meaning became diluted to the point 
where their very meaning was lost, Berlin similarly railed against the confusion of concepts for 
what they are not. 
In a representative moment of Berlin’s approach to the Cold War, Berlin wrote: 
“Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human 
happiness or a quiet conscience.” 110 Unlike the utopian promise, Berlin did not make a vague 
mention of a future destination. The idea that values must be recognized at their present worth 
and not for their potential to realize some uncertain eventuality in the future was characteristic of 
Berlin’s claim that “we cannot legislate for the unknown consequences of consequences of 
consequences.”111 Simultaneously there was a pluralist balancing of values that affords 
consideration for their clash, injecting doubt in utopian promise of universal harmony.  
What Berlin sought to make absolutely clear was the absurdity of the idea that all which 
is considered good by rational people can be infinitely and invariably made to coalesce. Berlin 
did not want political theory to muddle real outcomes. 
If the liberty of myself or my class or nation depends on the misery of a number 
of other human beings, the system which promotes this is unjust and immoral. But 
if I curtail or lose my freedom in order to lessen the shame of such inequality, and 
do not thereby materially increase the individual liberty of others, an absolute loss 
of liberty occurs. This may be compensated for by a gain in justice or in happiness 
or in peace, but the loss remains, and it is a confusion of values to say that 
although my ‘liberal’, individual freedom may go by the board, some other kind 
of freedom—‘social’ or ‘economic’—is increased.112 
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Such a distortion of political values was not unique to the Soviets, however. Liberals were just as 
likely to conceive of goodness as something akin to a unifying Platonic ideal. Berlin’s critique of 
the tendency applied equally to both.  
 By using the same logic to both attack Soviet Communism and reform his own liberal 
beliefs, Berlin struck a delicate balance in the Cold War conflict. Having severed Soviet 
Communism from its roots in nineteenth century Russia, Berlin maintained sufficient distance 
from the Soviet state of mind with his defense of pluralism to justify a position of antagonistic 
intellectual tension. Though Berlin distanced Soviet intellectualism enough to justify an 
antagonistic ideological relationship, he did not distance it so far as to demean the Russian 
culture in the process. By keeping the roots of Russian thought within the European intellectual 
tradition, Berlin avoided ostracizing Russian culture as the product of an entirely foreign 
civilization bound to inevitable conflict with Europe.  
 By faulting the Soviet political elite with a fanatic perversion of Marxist theory and 
establishing it as a clean break from the past, Berlin managed to keep previous currents of 
Russian intellectualism within the familiar milieu of the Western intellectual tradition. Thus he 
managed to defend much of what made Russian culture before the Bolshevik Revolution, 
without relenting in his opposition to Lenin and Stalin.  
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Chapter Three: The New Role of the Intellectual  
Who Fights a War of Ideas? 
 It was not until 1957 that Berlin began to compose what is considered by many to be his 
single most influential piece of work, “Two Concepts of Liberty.”113 Delivered in Berlin’s 
inaugural address for his new post as the Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at 
Oxford’s All Souls College, it was in many ways a succinct, yet thoroughly well-conceived and 
comprehensive articulation of much of Berlin’s thought up to that point in his life. The lecture 
not only cohesively synthesized Berlin’s thoughts on liberty as a political end, but it was an early 
version of what was to later become Berlin’s defense of value pluralism. And so, it was 
surprising that for the most striking passage of his brief opening remarks, Berlin turned not to his 
familiar sources of intellectual inspiration—Vico, Herder, Tolstoy, Herzen, even Machiavelli—
but Heinrich Heine, a German poet he rarely cited.  
 For the first few minutes, Berlin made no mention whatsoever of liberty or what two 
concepts of it were. Instead, he veered into a tangent entirely away from “social and political 
theory,” the subject that might have suited his new title. In something of an almost deliberate 
attempt at self-glorification, he referenced Heine to discuss ideas and intellectuals instead. “Over 
a hundred years ago, the German poet Heine warned the French not to underestimate the power 
of ideas: philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of a professor's study could destroy a 
civilization,” Berlin began.114 As if issuing a reminder aimed on the one hand at his former 
colleagues who had lost themselves in the minutiae of analytical philosophy, and on the other at 
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the rest of the world who thought that the twentieth century no longer had a place for academics, 
Berlin made a case as to why ideas mattered. And so, Berlin continued: 
[Heine] spoke of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as the sword with which German 
deism had been decapitated, and described the works of Rousseau as the 
blood-stained weapon which, in the hands of Robespierre, had destroyed the old 
regime; and prophesied that the romantic faith of Fichte and Schelling would one 
day be turned, with terrible effect, by their fanatical German followers, against the 
liberal culture of the West. The facts have not wholly belied this prediction; but if 
professors can truly wield this fatal power, may it not be that only other 
professors, or, at least, other thinkers (and not governments or congressional 
committees), can alone disarm them?115 
Though it was a deceptive opening to a lecture titled “Two Concepts of Liberty,” the tangent of 
the professor’s study was remarkable in its placement. Berlin’s message was clear. Ideas, 
especially of the kind that concerned him, had significant material consequences; the following 
contents of his lecture mattered outside the gates of All Souls. The reminder was of where the 
intellectual belonged and why ideas mattered.  
 Berlin’s argued that ideas mattered because intellectual currents had the power to 
influence political theory, which in turn could determine the fate of civilizations. Manipulated 
for misguided or sinister ends, ideas could be used to justify human tragedies on a grand scale, as 
the Nazis had proven in World War II.116 In such a world, fraught with not only the dangers of 
evil-minded intentions, but also the pitfalls of genuine but misguided ones, the intellectual had 
the power to affect matters of eventual life and death of not only individuals but also entire 
civilizations. While Berlin was not the first to conceive of ideas as having material power, his 
body of works show a genuinely faith in this belief and a conscious awareness of his potential 
role as a Cold War intellectual.   
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 The timing of Berlin’s Heine reference suggests that he saw the greatest dangers and 
most central motivations of the Cold War as intellectual concerns. Significant stakes of the Cold 
War were, as Berlin’s opening implied, measured by the outcome of ideological battles. In an 
antagonistic environment of ideas the implication became clear: the intellectual became warrior.  
 For if the professor could, in the stillness of his study, dismantle the strongest of 
civilizations at the peak of their powers, then he was also required to bear the burden of combat 
in a conflict over the very product of his daily work. Intellectuals not only had to provide the 
motivations behind the need for antagonism between the liberal West and communist Soviets, 
but also became directly responsible for contesting what was right and what was wrong.  
 Given the expectation of objectivity in Western academia, the concept of the intellectual 
as warrior is an alarming one. The most salient work to discuss this expectation of objectivity in 
scholarly knowledge is Edward Said’s Orientalism.117 As Said points out: “the determining 
impingement on most knowledge produced in the contemporary West…is that it be nonpolitical, 
that is, scholarly, academic, impartial, above partisan or small-minded doctrinal belief.”118 A 
figure like Berlin was not only an intellectual in the sense that he dealt with ideas—the 
manipulation of which, as Heine suggested, was not in itself a historical anomaly—but he was 
also an academic—whose supposed profession was to seek after truth—and one of the finest 
English-speaking examples at that. To suggest that an academic of Berlin’s caliber was not only 
partisan, but deeply invested in the outcome of the Cold War’s political conflict, implies a 
blatant disregard to the belief—or as Said would argue, the myth—that academics and their 
works ought to be impartial, even indifferent to the objects of their focus. Yet Said also points 	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out that objectivity and impartiality are hardly possible in the most optimistic reality, given that 
“no one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life.”119 
At best, Said argued, the intellectual finds himself unintentionally violating the myth of 
impartiality. Thus, even the best-intentioned scholar will find himself embroiled in one bias or 
another.  
 In any case, the myth of the disinterested intellectual working toward a unifying and 
objective truth was part of an Enlightenment project that Berlin vehemently opposed. While 
Berlin admired the achievements of natural scientists beginning in the seventeenth century, he 
was skeptical of thinkers such as Descartes, Bacon, or Voltaire who suggested that by using 
reason all manner of human knowledge could theoretically be unified so as to reveal “eternal, 
timeless truths, identical in all spheres of human activity—moral and political, social and 
economic, scientific and artistic.”120  For Berlin, a major fallacy of French Enlightenment 
rationalism was the very notion that academics of all persuasions, whether of the natural sciences 
or humanities, could work toward the achievement of some objective truth.121 Intellectuals, in 
Berlin’s mind, were not “engineers of human souls,” as Stalin had insisted. They were not tasked 
to “look on the human beings at their disposal as material which is infinitely malleable within the 
confines revealed by the sciences.”122 Thus, Berlin argued that humanists could not plausibly 
approach their profession in the same way natural scientists approached their. 
 Berlin’s objective in the very conflict of the Cold War was thus far more than an 
unwitting entanglement with a distant subject of study. Berlin makes no pretension of being 
disinterested in the Cold War’s outcome; he picked his side and attacked the other. Berlin saw 	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his own Cold War role in terms that far exceed those of Said’s Orientalists. At the very least, 
Said leaves open the possibility that Flaubert and Chateaubriand spoke for and misrepresented 
the objectified Orient ignorant of their errors and innocent of malicious intentions.123 For Said, 
there was no certainty of a “nefarious ‘Western’ imperialist plot to hold down the ‘Oriental’ 
world,” though the consequence of Orientalist literature was invariably “a distribution of 
geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and 
philological texts.”124 For Berlin, unlike Flaubert or Chateaubriand, there was little room to 
protest innocence of intention in his intellectual confrontation with Soviet ideology. Berlin’s was 
a deliberately conceived assault on an intellectual system that he saw as a threat in its falsity and 
incompatibility with his own framework of ideas.  
 Throughout his analysis of Soviet political theory, Berlin was clear about his intent and 
his ambitions to reveal the misguided intentions of Soviet Communism. The Soviet Union, and 
its conception of man as merely the substance of history, presented an epistemological hazard 
with which Berlin was not prepared, or willing, to accept. Given that the very foundations not 
only of his political theory, but his understanding of truth were under attack, retaliation was the 
obvious response and it meant engaging Soviet thought directly.  
 As the Cold War intellectual became warrior, the terms and grounds of the conflict 
adjusted appropriately. Where the detached scholar might theoretically have been able to define a 
conflict’s scope with some claim to impartiality, the scholar who became warrior also picked a 	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side. Thus the very definition of the conflict, its scope, and its stakes became part of the conflict 
itself. Moreover, the scholar no longer concerned himself purely with facts, as there could be no 
politically impartial search for truth. Instead the scholar becomes a fabricator of perceptions, 
fashioning and influencing conflicts through ideological dialogues.  
 With Cold War objectives in mind, it did not concern Berlin’s objective to prove, at least 
with a great deal of historical rigor, that the Soviet Union’s people or even sympathizers actually 
believed in the historicist notion of human events. So long as Soviet ideology saw history as 
governed by metaphysical laws and took its subsequent implications on individual agency to 
heart, the views of the people did not matter. As a Cold War intellectual participating in the 
conflict, Berlin’s purpose was not to be a historian of Soviet society or of the people, especially 
given his view that “the Party and the state are engaged in sweeping away the smallest 
beginnings of independent thought.”125 Berlin’s objective was to respond to Soviet ideas, the 
representation of which was monopolized by a small group of Communist Party leaders. Thus 
the actual pervasiveness of ideas in the Soviet population was significantly less relevant to 
Berlin’s Cold War interests than the “general line” of the Soviet Communist Party.126  
 For a Cold War intellectual like Berlin, the relevant conflict was over the political 
theories prevalent among intellectual and political elites—two populations, which had become 
one and the same given the Soviet regime’s suppression of public dissent.127 Despite Berlin’s 
status as a public intellectual—especially since he was given a platform on BBC radio—his work 
was not primarily prepared for consumption by the general public.128 Aside from a critique of 
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certain ideas—such as historicism or the utopian ideal—as being particularly liable to abuse, 
Berlin’s work had a second purpose as a warning to the people who used and manipulated them. 
In this two-part role of the Cold War intellectual, influencing the public was at most a means of 
attracting the attention of the politically powerful.  
 
The Dual Role of the Cold War Intellectual 
 Thus while Berlin revealed the perception of the Soviet Union as a threat in the falsity of 
its political theory and epistemological scheme, the answer was not merely to point out its falsity 
and assert a liberal alternative. Berlin knew that ideas could be powerful—as the Heine reference 
would suggest. However, Berlin’s work also revealed that the power of ideas could not be purely 
realized through their logical integrity or their philosophical verifiability. A conflict of ideas 
though it was, the Cold War and its resolution was not just a debate, where Western and Soviet 
intellectuals sat on different sides of the table, with a judge whose decision both sides agreed to 
respect beforehand.  
 Berlin’s view of ideas implied that human actors had to play out the authenticity of the 
intellectual battles which history would then tell. Ideas alone did not have the power to shed 
blood, they needed people to act on them, to make them part of the tangible, material reality of 
human life.129 For every Rousseau, there had to be a Robespierre or there would only have been 
swords with nobody to wield them. Yet, Berlin was skeptical that any promise of great 
advancement was worth the blood that a fanatic with dangerous ideas could shed with senseless 	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disregard to human life by glorifying extremism, conflict, and war as means to achieving utopian 
society.130 His reasoning was that “few things have played a more fatal part in the history of 
human thought and action than great imaginative analogies from one sphere, in which a 
particular principle is applicable and valid, to other provinces, where its effect may be exciting 
and transforming, but where its consequences may be fallacious in theory and ruinous in 
practice.”131 To avoid the senseless blood shedding in the name of ideas, it was necessary first to 
dull the blades of the double-edged sword and second to diminish the power and fanaticism of 
the people who would potentially wield the sword. Both parts of the project were aimed at 
minimizing the destructive potential inherent in world changing ideas. 
 What was most dangerous, for Berlin, was the perversion and manipulation of ideas by 
powerful people with a tendency to take them too seriously. The logic was that if a fanatic could 
misinterpret the Sermon on the Mount or Mill’s theory of Utilitarianism to justify lying to his 
father and killing his neighbor, the dictator who, armed with a vision of the road to utopia for his 
state, can similarly be inspires prepared to commit a genocide to reach paradise. The experience 
of fascism in Europe between the two World Wars, Berlin argued, was an example of the 
combination of political power and ideological fanaticism. In the fascist case, Joseph de Maistre 
was one such intellectual culprit behind Hitler’s crimes. European fascism was, according to 
Berlin, a situation where “totalitarian society, which Maistre, in the guide of historical analysis, 
had visualized, became actual; and thereby, at inestimable cost in human suffering, [vindicated] 
the depth and brilliance of a remarkable, and terrifying, prophet.”132  
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 Though fascism had been defeated, Berlin warned that the Soviet Union had an equally 
dangerous combination of authoritarian regime and ideological fanaticism.133 In Lenin and then 
Stalin, Berlin implied, the Soviet Union had two leaders who were prepared to commit great 
atrocities to end history in the name of a classless utopia that may or may never be reached.  
 Thus the Cold War intellectual’s role as warrior had two parts—both of which Berlin 
fulfilled. 134 First the Cold War intellectual needed to be critical of the dangerous potential of 
particular ideas circulating within the Soviet Union. To reiterate, for Berlin this was the 
suppression of a latent mentality for historicism that erupted during and after the Bolshevik 
Revolution. The intellectual’s responsibility was to prevent the spreading of false and dangerous 
ideas. The motivation to counter such ideas explain Berlin’s opposition to “the deliberate act of 
tampering with human beings so as to make them behave in a way which, if they knew what they 
were doing, or what its consequences were likely to be, would make them recoil with horror and 
disgust.”135 Though it was impossible to simply snuff out the ideas of Hegel, Marx, or Lenin, 
Berlin sought to diminish their appeal. Almost paradoxically, Berlin’s critique implied that the 
intellectual’s role in a conflict of ideas was to restrain the very power of ideas.  
 The second part of the intellectual’s role as Cold War warrior was to be critical of the 
people who used and manipulated those same ideas, for potentially dangerous ideas require real 
political power to materialize into real political dangers. The Soviet pretension of knowing 
historical laws gave Lenin and Stalin the impression that they understood the mechanics of 
governance with scientific precision when they knew nothing of the sort. Berlin argued that this 	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mistaken belief was what caused the Politburo to apprehend the outside world in terms of 
fundamental categories “from the cluster of theories put forward by Marx and Hegel, and 
adapted by Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Tito and others.136 Using such logic, for example, Stalin could 
promise social progress and write off significant negative consequences as merely the cost of 
advancement. Stalin’s rationale, which Berlin vehemently opposed, was akin to saying that to 
make an omelette, one has no choice but to break eggs.137 Berlin objected to such a rationale as if 
out of a weariness and skepticism left over from World War II. His skepticism was that “the one 
thing that we may be sure of is the reality of the sacrifice, the dying of the dead. But the ideal for 
the sake of which they die remains unrealized. The eggs are broken, and the habit of breaking 
them grows, but the omelette remains invisible.”138 The Cold War intellectual had to be critical 
of promised social progress at the cost of individuals, for the promise of social progress was 
uncertain to ever be delivered but the death or suffering of individuals was a guarantee.  
 The two-part role of the Cold War western intellectual was for Berlin bound inseparably. 
Just as ideas could give dictators inspiration and justification to commit absurd and unthinkable 
misdeeds, dictators could distort, misuse, and altogether create ideas for misguided goals. There 
was no pointing of fingers necessarily, for Berlin never quite indulged in the speculation that 
Lenin, Stalin, and their associates were necessarily evil and malicious people. Rather in Berlin’s 
claim that “the one thing which no utilitarian paradise, no promise of eternal harmony in the 
future within some vast organic whole will make us accept is the use of human beings as mere 
ends,” there was a more than stern skepticism with the promise of social progress when it asked 
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for individual sacrifice as a down payment.139 Given his belief that certain ideas—of which 
Soviet Communism was a strong example—were especially liable to take on lives of their own, 
it follows that Berlin believed it was up to the intellectual to not only impose restraint on the 
ideas themselves, but also the people who had the power to use them.   
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Conclusion 
 This thesis reconsiders the notion of the academic as observer. Instead, it assumes that the 
intellectual engaged with the Cold War was an active participant. By revising Isaiah Berlin’s role 
in the Cold War and reframing the perspective from which his work is understood, this thesis 
contributes a new understanding of Cold War dynamics. Works of Cold War scholarship such as 
Berlin’s were expressions of fears, attitudes, states of mind, and perceptions of their authors as 
much as they were attempts to understand the Soviet enemy. By examining contemporaneous 
scholarship on the Cold War as evidence of intellectual currents of key actors, it becomes 
possible to understand the Cold War beyond the terms of material conflict. 
As a conflict, the Cold War was not merely the sum of political tussles or diplomatic tit-
for-tats between rival superpowers. In the intellectual sphere of the Cold War, the conflict was 
rooted in basic epistemological differences, which Berlin claimed to have started in the 
nineteenth century. By recognizing Russia’s intelligentsia as representatives of its national 
conscience, Berlin—perhaps unwittingly—revealed the extent to which intellectuals would play 
a part in the Cold War. Bolshevik innovations would sever Soviet thought from its Russian 
predecessor, and out of this break came a radically unprecedented system of knowledge that 
epistemologically challenged the liberal paradigms of the West.  
Thus the Soviet faith in historicism profoundly disturbed the moral basis of liberal 
elements of the European intellectual tradition. Recognizing himself to be a part of the liberal 
European tradition, Berlin fashioned a Cold War warrior in his own form, conscious that the 
stakes and scope of the conflict could no longer be contained in material considerations such as 
politics or diplomacy. To fully understand the Cold War, it is necessary to reformulate the way 
war and peace are considered.   
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The narrow conception of the Cold War through the materially oriented lens of 
conventional warfare—that is to say military combat—is as Anders Stephanson points out 
“radically ‘under-determined,’” but nonetheless it comprises a prominent part of today’s 
historical understanding of the Cold War.140 Among the areas introduced into a broadened scope 
of the Cold War conflict is the intellectual arena. Thus to fully understand a conflict that 
expanded the very concept of war—and by the same token, peace—it was also necessary to 
revise fundamental assumptions about the function of intellectuals.  
In a conventional war, where victory can be achieved through a limited set of material 
outcomes—by killing the opposition, forcing his armies into surrender, subjugating his 
populations, capturing his cities and fortresses, etc—the intellectual, by definition, can be 
nothing more than an observer uninvolved with the conflict’s happenings and powerless to 
change outcomes. For the intellectual to become warrior in settings of conventional warfare, he 
must literally pick up a sword or an assault rifle. By taking up arms, however, the intellectual 
leaves his intellectualism aside and adopts a second role as warrior. In a very simple way, it is 
possible to consider Mao Zedong or Che Guevara as examples of such an intellectual-warrior 
duality. On the one hand, they wrote; on the other, they fought. While simultaneously doing 
both, their two roles did not overlap.  
The Cold War was different. The very nature of the conflict went beyond material 
considerations. Hostility existed as in a state of war, but there was ostensible peace as enemy 
soldiers were not necessarily engaged in combat. In such conditions of pseudo-conflict, as 
Stephanson points out, “the defining, decisive battle never comes.”141 Instead the battlefield 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Stephanson, “Fourteen Notes on the Very Concept of the Cold War,” 1.  
141 Ibid., 19.  
Zhang 57 
extended further, to where bullets and bombs could no longer reach. A significant new site of 
conflict in the Cold War was the ideological realm among intellectual currents. 
For the intellectual, the expansion of the battlefield meant that he could participate in the 
conflict in his own realm, in the professor’s study as Berlin pointed out. Instead of having to 
adopt a new and separate persona as warrior, the intellectual became one seamlessly and without 
internal conflict. This is not to say that all intellectuals became warriors in the Cold War. It is 
only to say that the greatly expanded role of the warrior more obviously overlapped at certain 
places with the traditional role of the intellectual. For academics like Isaiah Berlin, whose work 
engaged with political thought and moral questioning, the expanded definition of warrior perhaps 
even meant the inevitable adoption of the responsibilities of warrior.  
What is especially instructive about this exercise in treating the intellectual as participant 
in the conflict is its potential to impact the study of non-conventional conflicts beyond the Cold 
War. Moreover, it is potentially applicable to the understanding of a great number of 
intellectuals, not just Isaiah Berlin. However, here also are the limitations of this thesis. Its scope 
is simply not broad enough to encompass even a significant majority of Cold War thought. By 
limiting its scope to Isaiah Berlin, this project cannot claim to reveal a dominant Western 
intellectual discourse of the Cold War era. Berlin’s impact on other Cold War actors is not clear 
from this project alone. Moreover this thesis acknowledges that Soviet motivations and 
conceptions of the Cold War are left entirely unaccounted for. This redefined conflict of the Cold 
War aligns with an existing scholarly view of the Cold War as a Western construct. Specifically, 
this projects accounts for the Cold War as a conflict that took place in a state of mind within the 
Western liberal’s unconscious. While the intellectual’s perspective is only one among many in 
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